This paper assesses the relative efficiency of knowledge production in the OECD using a nonparametric DEA approach. Resources allocated to R&D are limited and should therefore be used efficiently given the institutional and legal constraints. This paper presents efficiency scores based on an intertemporal frontier estimation for the period 1995 to 2004 and analyzes the impact of the regulatory environment using the single bootstrap procedure suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007) . The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that barriers to entry, aimed at reducing competition, lower research efficiency by attenuating the incentive to innovate and to allocate resources efficiently.
Introduction
The notion of a knowledge production function is central to endogenous growth models in which innovation (ideas' productivity growth) is a main driver of sustainable long-term growth (Porter and Stern, 2000) . True innovation, in contrast to imitation, becomes even more important for productivity growth when a country approaches the world technology frontier because less room is left for copying. The empirical literature affirms the importance of the level and dynamics of R&D expenditures for economic growth (e.g. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2004) . Therefore, the efficient usage of the scarce resources devoted to R&D becomes increasingly important, especially in a globalized world. Countries are exposed to high levels of competition in domestic and foreign markets for innovative products and future technologies. This process forces nations to continuously update their technological capabilities. Countries utilizing their R&D resources inefficiently will be penalized with a growth discount.
Since the resources allocated to the generation of new knowledge are limited, they should be used as efficiently as possible given the local institutional, organizational and legal constraints. Hereby government policies aimed to encourage R&D play a major role in ensuring a sufficient level of R&D spending in the research process. Such policies ensuring a high level of competition by reducing market entry barriers are likely to affect innovation and research efficiency. Among others, Acs and Audretsch (1990) and Geroski (1991) found a positive link between the rates of entry and innovation. Studies by Baldwin and Gorecki (1991) and Geroski (1989) document a productivity enhancing effect of market entry on the industry level and recently Aghion et al. (2009) claim that entry encourages incumbent innovation and productivity growth.
The influence of market entry on research efficiency is twofold: first, high entry rates increase the incentives to innovate and thereby the overall level of research and development expenditures in a country. Market entry is often used as a vehicle for introducing new innovations (Geroski 1995) . New innovative firms challenge incumbents that are often more interested in protecting their existing position than in seeking new business opportunities. Incumbents are then forced to increase their R&D investment in order to acquire a lead over their rivals due to a more competitive environment. Thus, more resources are allocated to R&D via growing incentives to innovate. Second, increasing competition by new entries forces firms to improve their R&D process. In competitive markets, firms are punished more severely for being inefficient (Boone, 2008) . Competitive pressure induced by entrants increases the incentives to allocate the scarce resources optimally to ensure survival. Thus, high entry rates are associated with higher rates of innovation and increases in efficiency.
In light of this, the degree of governmental regulation plays a crucial role in ensuring low barriers to entry by altering market structures. A strict regulatory environment might hamper the entry of new competitors, like innovative entrepreneurs, and thereby reduce efficiency in the production and research processes. Hence in our empirical analysis, we test the hypothesis that governmental barriers to competition lower research efficiency by distorting the incentive to innovate.
Our model specification follows the "knowledge production function" framework, developed by Griliches (1979) and implemented by Pakes and Griliches (1984) , Jaffe (1986) , and Hall and Ziedonis (2001) . According to Griliches (1979) , innovative output is the product of knowledge generating inputs, similar to the production of physical goods. Some observable measures of inputs, such as R&D expenditures and the number of researchers, are invested in the knowledge production process and directed toward producing economically valuable knowledge. The process is seen as a continuum leading from R&D and human capital as inputs to some observable measure of innovative activity. Formally, it can be summarized using a knowledge production function:
where I is innovative output, R&D denotes R&D expenditures and R is the number of researchers engaged. The unit of observation is the country (c) level.
Innovative output as the result of knowledge production is hard to capture. We argue in favor of patent applications as a measure of valuable output of the knowledge production process. The use of patents as an indicator of innovative output has without a doubt some drawbacks. First of all, patent applications are often criticized as measuring just one component of the innovative output since inventors may choose other protectionist strategies like secrecy. The use of patents would thus underestimate real innovative activity.
Second, research has shown that the value of patents is skewed to the right, with only some patents being highly valuable. This observation has been discussed by numerous authors, e.g. Scherer (1965) , Pakes and Schankerman (1984) , Pakes (1986) , and Griliches (1990) .
Despite this criticism, patents are probably the most important indicator of research output.
They are by definition related to inventiveness and based on an objective and relatively stable standard. Furthermore, data on patent application is widely available and provides additional information about the origin of the inventor and a detailed technological classification of the underlying invention. Therefore, patent applications are extensively used in the literature (e.g. Kortum, 1997) .
The empirical literature using a knowledge production function framework affirms the importance of level and dynamics of research personnel and R&D expenditures as input factors. However, only recently the empirical literature has put more emphasis on the efficient usage of scarce resources. The relevant studies on research efficiency in this field that motivated our approach are summarized in Table 1. We contribute in the following three aspects to the existing literature: We measure research efficiency in OECD countries and consider R&D expenditures distinguishing between public and private sources on the input side as well as accounting for the possibility of multiple inventors on the output side. In addition, we study the impact of product market regulation on research efficiency by applying a consistent two stage truncated regression approach proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) . t ψ is then defined as according to Simar and Wilson (2007) :
The R&D technology frontier (efficiency frontier) is then defined as the maximum output attainable from each input level (see Coelli et al., 2005) and countries may or may not be on the frontier of this technology. A particular county's distance from the technology frontier may depend on a mixture of different country specific factors. These factors may be exogenous, such as governmental regulatory policies and barriers to entrepreneurship, which in turn affect performance and therefore the distance to the frontier. Thus, the distance from the actual input/output combination to the frontier of the technology set ψ is assumed to correspond to the inefficiency caused by country specific exogenous factors of governmental regulatory policies and some unexplained statistical noise (see Barros and Dieke, 2008) . The objective of this paper is to assess in a first stage such inefficiency and then investigate in a second stage its dependency on various indicators of the regulatory environment in each country.
2 For a survey on the theoretical literature see Cooper et al. (2004) .
Stage 1: Estimation of relative R&D efficiency scores
In the first stage we use the Farrell/Debreu-type output oriented efficiency measure 3 :
θ measures the radial distance between the observation and the efficiency frontier.
The efficiency score is the point on the frontier characterized by the level of inputs that should be reached to be efficient (Simar and Wilson, 1998) . A value of
country is fully efficient and thus is located on the efficiency frontier. As in practice the technology set ψ is unobserved and we replace it with its DEA-estimate (see Wilson, 2007 and Dieke, 2008) . 4 Calculations can be made using either an input-orientation where the output vector is held fixed and inputs are minimized to be efficient. Contrary to the case of output-orientation the input vector is fixed and outputs are maximized to be efficient. We apply output orientation since it is reasonable to assume that countries aim to optimize and maximize the research output with a given level of R&D expenditures and the number researchers. In the variable returns to scale model, the determination of the efficiency score of the i-th firm in a sample of N firms is equivalent to the following optimization (see Coelli et al., 2005) :
The identified efficient countries could serve as peers to help improve performance of less efficient ones via technology transfer or detailed process analysis.
The DEA estimator belongs to the deterministic frontier models, which imply that all observations are assumed to be technically attainable. They are highly sensitive to outliers
and extreme values in the data Wilson, 2000, 2007) . It is therefore important to assess ex ante if outliers in the data inappropriately influence the estimation of the performance of other countries in the sample. This paper uses the method of superefficiency (see Chang, 2006 and Andersen and Peterson, 1993) to identify and delete extreme values ex-ante. Within the super-efficiency approach, decision-making units within the efficiency frontier might obtain an efficiency score greater than one because the observation itself cannot be used as a peer (see Coelli et al., 2005) and therefore cannot form part of its reference frontier. β the coefficients to be estimated. Both sides are bounded by unity (see Wilson, 2007 and Dieke, 2008) , thus i ε is restricted by the condition
. Therefore a truncated normal distribution for i ε with a left truncation point at
is assumed. The truncated regression model is estimated by means of maximum likelihood. A parametric bootstrap procedure is used to estimate standard errors and confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients (for a detailed description of the estimation algorithm see Simar and Wilson, 2007) .
Model Specification and Data
The empirical DEA model is specified as follows: based on the notion of a knowledge production function we use R&D expenditures and labor invested in R&D on the input side.
Hereby, we distinguish between R&D expenditures conducted by business enterprises 7 , by the government 8 and by the higher education sector 9 . This differentiation provides a more detailed picture compared to the conventional use of aggregate R&D 10 because the distribution of R&D expenditures over sources varies remarkably across countries. The importance of public vs. private R&D is country-specific and should therefore be taken into account when measuring research efficiency. Furthermore, the productivity of R&D may vary 6 They argue that the serial correlation arises due to the fact that perturbations of observations lying on the frontier will often cause changes in efficiencies estimated for other observations. The semi-parametric twostage model has been used already in other sectors and applications (see e.g. Barros and Dieke, 2008 for an evaluation of airports and Barros and Peypoch, 2007 for a measurement of technical efficiency in thermoelectric power plants). 7 BERD in R&D terminology of MSTI 8 GOVERD in R&D terminology of MSTI 9 HERD in R&D terminology of MSTI 10 GERD in R&D terminology of MSTI across sectors--a dollar invested in private R&D might increase a country's patent output more than a dollar invested in public R&D (see Wang, 2007) . The distinction between private and public R&D is especially useful since the question of whether these are complements or substitutes has not yet been satisfactorily answered in the literature (David et al., 2000) .
Another ongoing discussion in specifying knowledge production is the distinction between R&D stocks and R&D expenditures (see e.g. Wang and Huang, 2007 using A number of applications of DEA on research efficiency in the past also suggested the use of scientific publications as an additional output (see Table 1 ). However, recent studies revealed a number of measurement problems inherent in the publication counts like coauthoring 13 and language bias (Rousseau and Rousseau, 1997) and therefore reject its usage (Sharma and Thomas, 2008) .
This study analyzes research efficiency based on a sample of 26 OECD member countries and and two non-member countries (Argentina, China). The European Patent Office's Worldwide 11 In line with the literature we assume a depreciation rate of 15%. 12 measured in full time equivalents. 13 The usage of all-author publication counts tends to overestimate the output of a country due to double counting when authors come from the same country.
Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT 14 ) serves as the base of information on patent applications.
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Central to our exercise is the construction of patent aggregates by country and year. We build this variable by using all patent applications filed with the European Patent Office according to their priority date between 1995 and 2004. We focus on EPO applications since an application to an international authority, in contrast to one made to a national authority, can be taken as a signal that the patentee believes the invention to be of high enough value to justify the expense of in international application. The term priority date refers to the date where the given invention was covered by a patent for the first time. However, this first filing of a given invention mainly occurs at the national level and therefore the majority of patent applications at the EPO are second stage filings. Accordingly, in this study we date patent applications using the priority instead of the usual application date because it closest to the date of invention and the decision to apply for a patent protecting the given invention (de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2007).
In the event that the country of the inventor and that of the applicant vary, (as with multinationals) patent applications are assigned to the country of the inventor, which compared to the country of the applicant, is closer to the location of invention. The literature has until now usually considered only the first inventor's country of residence (e.g. Wang 2007 , WIPO 2008 and thereby ignores research cooperations across country borders.
To overcome this problem, we construct patent aggregates based on all inventors' countries of residence and compare them with the conventional first inventor approach. The aggregation based on multiple inventors is conducted in two different ways:
• First, an unweighted sum over all inventors' countries of residence is calculated. This is by definition at least as large as the sum of all first inventors since patents with more than one inventor count more than once. Therefore, such an aggregation procedure might induce a bias due to double counting.
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• Second, we derive a weighted sum where all patent applications are assigned the reciprocal of the number of inventor countries in the original patent application as weights, meaning that an application with three inventor countries only contributes a third to each country's aggregate. Empirical testing of the correlation between the first inventor and the multiple inventor output measures leads to the conclusion that all can be used as an approxiamtion of inventive output and will behave rather similar in the empirical application. However, in the case of small countries the conventional first inventor approach could lead to an underestimation of patent output when countries engange extensively in cross-border research cooperations.
Therefore, we argue in favor of weighted patent aggregates as the appropriate output for the DEA application.
Consistent with recent literature on research efficiency (Sharma and Thomas, 2008 and Wang and Huang, 2007) , we impose a lag structure on inputs to account for the fact that R&D efforts do not immediately lead to innovative output (Hall et al., 1986) . Therefore, inputs are lagged by two years in the DEA application. The different model specifications summarizing the input-output combinations are provided in Table 2 . 
In the second stage of our empirical analysis we evaluate the impact of barriers to entry caused by regulation on research efficiency. The regulatory environment is captured using the product market regulation indicators provided by the OECD in 1998 and 2003 (Conway et al., 2005) . These indicators focus on the regulations which are potentially able to reduce competition in the areas of product markets. Information on regulation is collected on a questionnaire basis aiming at specific policies applied by the government. The information on regulation in coded between 0 and 6 and increases with the restrictiveness of regulation.
From this information a product market indicator system is derived based on 16 low-level indicators to cover various policy options. By means of principal component analysis, the low-level indicators are aggregated to sub-domain and domain-levels with the three domains being
• state control (extent of government control over business),
• barriers to trade and investment and
• barriers to entrepreneurship.
In our analysis about the influence of regulation on research efficiency, we focus on the domain barriers to entrepreneurship. In case of research efficiency, the regulations of considerable interest are those that influence the amount of competitive pressure by raising or lowering barriers to entry. A substantial amount of potential competitors are entrepreneurs which are either encouraged or deterrred from the prevalent degree of product market regulation. We find these aspects being reflected best in the barriers to entrepreneurship domain of the indicator (Table 3 ). In 1998, the countries with the highest level of regulation in this area were France, Italy and Poland while the Czech Republic ranked highest in 2003. Nearly all countries showed some improvement in the regulatory environment between 1998 and 2003. The domain indicator barriers to entrepreneurship is a composite indicator and is calculated in two steps: first, the following seven low-level indicators are derived by summarizing the information from the questionnaires:
• Licenses and permit system: reflecting rules for obtaining and issuing licenses and permits (z1),
• Communication and simplification of rules and procedures: reflecting government's communication strategy to reduce administrative burdens (z2),
• Administrative burdens for corporations: depicts administrative burdens on corporation creation (z3),
• Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms: depicts administrative burdens on sole proprietor firm creation (z4),
• Sector-specific administrative burdens: measures administrative burdens in transport and retail distribution (z5),
• Legal barriers: measures legal limitations on the number of competitors (z6),
• Antitrust exemptions: measures the scope for exceptions to competition law for public enterprises (z7).
Second, these low-level indicators are aggregated by means of principal component analysis to the three sub-domain indicators:
• Regulatory and administrative opacity: z1 and z2,
• Administrative burdens on startups: z3, z4 and z5,
• Barriers to competition: z6 and z7. Nevertheless, all indicators declined on average during the covered period.
Empirical Results
The empirical analysis is divided into two main sections. First the relative R&D efficiency is determined using DEA to identify the OECD countries that perform efficiently with respect to R&D efforts. Based on a ranking we assess countries that could serve as peers to help improve performance of less efficient countries. We estimate an intertemporal frontier, more precisely a cross section pooled frontier, where each observation is accounted for as a single unit without considering any panel structure of the data. Country averages are then calculated over the observation period.
In the second part we assess the impact of regulatory and administrative opacity, administrative burdens and barriers to competition on R&D efficiency by means of the truncated two-stage semi parametric regression proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) .
Relative R&D efficiency
We assume output orientation, thus countries aim to maximize the R&D output resulting from their inputs. In this context, inputs are exogenous. We estimate both, the constant returns to scale model (CRS, Charnes et al. 1978 ) and the variable returns to scale model (VRS, Banker et al.) . Within the CRS model, technical and scale efficiency are aggregated, whereas the VRS model measures the pure technical efficiency. Scale efficiency can therefore be determined by the difference between the results obtained from both specifications. The scale efficiency indicates if size and magnitude of the research production process in the countries is optimal.
Our sample includes East European countries like Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia which underwent a transition period after 1989. To leave room for changes towards marketoriented structures, we start our observation period in 1995. To ensure comparability across countries and years, we exclude countries for which less than four years are available from our sample. 16 In total, we end up with 217 observations which are representative for nonparametric estimation of relative efficiency by means of DEA under both (VRS and CRS)
assumptions.
The underlying model for nonparametric efficiency analysis has to be robust against outliers and extreme values in the sample. To ensure a consistent and robust technology frontier we conduct ex ante outlier detection by means of super-efficiency analysis. We apply the criterion outlined in Banker and Chang (2006) and define outliers by an efficiency score of larger than 1.2. Only two observations obtain an efficiency score larger than 1.2 and are excluded from further calculations. 17 The small amount of observations revealing an efficiency score above 1.2 indicates that our frontier is not spanned by a number of unrealistic and extreme data points. Therefore, we claim the frontier being robust and consistent for the relative efficiency measurement of the remaining countries within the sample (214 observations).
We test three model specifications as outlined in section 3 ( Table 2) . The difference between model 1 and model 2 is the weighting scheme applied when deriving the patent aggregates.
Model 1 uses weights for multiple inventors while model 2 involves double counting. As expected the results are highly similar due to strong correlation and a rank correlation of about 0.97. The ranking of the countries only changes slightly in the midfield (see for instance Italy and Ireland) which could be caused by the different degree of engagement in cross country research projects and country size.
In Model 3 we use aggregated R&D expenditures as inputs instead of R&D expenditures by source. Compared to model 1 we find a somewhat lower rank correlation (0.90) and slight changes in the ranking with the main difference being Sweden losing its top position. We argue in favor of model 1 since we believe that disaggregating the inputs provides a more detailed picture of the research process in countries and therefore adds useful information to our analysis. Furthermore as it is known from the literature from author publication counts, double counting of outputs overestimates efficiency. Hence, we prefer Model 1 to Model 2. The relative R&D and scale efficiency scores of our benchmark model 1 are provided in Table 6 .
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The difference between the CRS and VRS scores indicates scale efficiency. Table 6 shows that the majority of countries are not characterized by an optimal size of the research production process with respect to input allocation. Only Germany, France and the United Kingdom feature constant returns to scale while Sweden, the United States and Japan show decreasing returns to scale.
The intertemporal frontier estimation exhibits an average technical efficiency of 0.39 in the CRS specification and 0.45 in the VRS specification. This is relatively low compared to other empirical work. It indicates that large inefficiencies are present within the knowledge production process. The low mean efficiency might also be explained by the fact that the sample includes low innovation intensive countries like China or Korea from 1995 onwards.
As shown below, these countries only started recently to adapt their R&D expenditures to increase patent output. Furthermore, the intertemporal frontier is defined by the latest years in our sample, indicating that technological progress took place over time. Hence, it is not surprising that covering a larger time span lowers mean efficiency.
We calculate the mean annual efficiency from 1995 to 2004 by averaging over the individual efficiency scores of the countries per year. Implicitly we make the assumption of a constant intertemporal frontier and thereby consider the relative changes of the countries' positions towards the estimated DEA technology frontier. This is motivated by two aspects: first, we face a small annual sample size (of less than 30 observations) which makes it difficult to obtain robust and meaningful results. Second, we do not have a balanced panel data set, which prevents us from comparisons of different frontiers for different years, by means of e.g. Malmquist Indices (see Coelli, 2005 to a home bias that would benefit European countries. Therefore we find the United States is one of the leading and most efficient countries in research and development worldwide. In light of this estimation bias, the position of Japan is also worth mentioning since its performance is above average and it is -as expected -the leading Asian country. This is probably due to their leading role in communication and electronics as well as in the research intensive pharmaceutical industry.
The innovative capacity of advanced industrial countries is their most important source of prosperity and growth. Overall, our results suggest that a matured economic system leads to higher research efficiency compared to countries still developing their industry and technology pattern. Therefore, it is not surprising that the red lantern goes to Poland, Mexico and China which are characterized by a very low capacity of knowledge production, suggesting that they are still in the phase of imitating and replicating existing technologies, while only little effort is made on innovating at the world technology frontier.
The impact of regulatory environmental factors
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we test the influence of the regulatory environment on research efficiency according to the semi-parametric two stage approach suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007) . We argue that regulation reduces competition by raising barriers to entry and thereby lowering competitive pressure and the incentives to innovate efficiently. In a third step we conduct a robustness check, identify the statistically significant disaggregated indicator from the previous estimation and test their influence in a separate estimation. Our estimation results are provided in Table 7 . We find that the aggregated sub-domain indicators do not have a significant impact on research efficiency as can be seen from the bootstrapped confidence intervals. However, this cannot be interpreted as regulation being irrelevant for innovation since these indicators encompass various aspects providing an average image of barriers to entry. To obtain a more detailed picture regarding the different components, the effects of the aggregated indicators are disentangled by assessing their influences separately. Our estimation results suggest that three low-level indicators, namely communication and simplification of rules and procedures, sector specific administrative burdens have a significant positive impact on efficiency scores as shown by the bootstrapped confidence intervals. A positive impact implies that lowering the degree of regulation in these specific areas lowers barriers to entry and thus significantly increases research efficiency.
The low-level indicator on communication and simplification of rules and procedures can be interpreted as summarizing stumbling blocks related to the collection of information on start-up requirements, the enforcement of regulation and the treatment of administrative burdens. Therefore, less regulation in this field suggests an emphasis by the government on activities that facilitate innovation and entrepreneurship. This could be interpreted as a relevant factor stimulating competition by encouraging potential entrants to start a business.
In case of sector specific burdens, our results suggest that specific burdens being levied on the sector-level reduce research efficiency significantly. This result is probably mainly driven by country-specific heterogeneity since it depends on the economic importance and size of the sectors being regulated in an economy. Therefore, it implies that competitive barriers may play a larger role in specific sectors of the economy.
The third low-level indicator exhibiting a significant impact in our study covers antitrust exemptions for public enterprises. This is not surprising since the incentive of public enterprises to strengthen their position by innovation is reduced when they are protected by governmental regulations. Hence, antitrust exemptions are accompanied by lower research efficiency since there is less pressure on companies to innovate and patent efficiently.
The robustness check which evaluates solely the significant low-level indicators corroborates our findings from the previous estimations with slightly larger point estimates and confidence intervals. 20 Table 7 : Estimation results 20 Due to large confidence intervals caused by the parametric bootstrap procedure we limit ourselves to interpreting the direction of the influence instead of the size of the point estimate. All estimation with constant, * significant at 10% level Overall, our results can be summarized as follows: the decision of potential entrants to start a business depends considerably on their regulatory environment. A highly regulated product market might dissuade people from entering which reduces competition and thereby the incentive to innovate and allocate the resources devoted to R&D efficiently.
Conclusions
This paper assesses the relative efficiency of public and private research expenditures in the OECD using nonparametric efficiency analysis approaches, a data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique. In times of globalization the efficient usage of the scarce resources a country invests in R&D becomes increasingly important. Therefore, this paper sheds light on 21 The weights are taken from Conway et al. (2005) and are derived from principal component analysis.
the research efficiency differences among OECD countries and its relationship to a country's regulatory environment.
The empirical analysis is conducted in two steps: in the first stage, an intertemporal knowledge production frontier is estimated. Our results suggest that Sweden, Germany and the United States belong to the best performing countries, located on or close to the world technology frontier. These countries could serve as peers to improve efficiency for less efficient ones. The innovative capacity of advanced industrial countries is their most important source of prosperity and growth. Thus, our results confirm the idea that a mature economic system leads to higher research efficiency compared to countries still developing their industry and technology pattern. The red lantern in case of research efficiency goes to
Mexico and China which are characterized by a very low rate of knowledge production, suggesting that they are still in the phase of imitating and replicating existing technologies, while only little effort is made to innovate at the world technology frontier.
Government policies aimed at encouraging R&D play a major role in ensuring a sufficient level of R&D spending. We hypothesize that regulation reduces competition by raising barriers to entry, thereby lowering competitive pressure and the incentives to innovate efficiently. In the second stage of the analysis we assess the impact of the regulatory environment on research efficiency, using the recently developed single bootstrap procedures developed by Simar and Wilson (2007) . The regulatory environment is described using the indicator of product market regulation provided by the OECD.
Our estimation results show that the low-level indicators on communication and simplification of rules and procedures, antitrust exemptions and sector specific burdens have a significant impact, suggesting that larger degrees of regulation in these fields lowers research efficiency. Overall, our results confirm our hypothesis that high regulation in product markets dissuades potential entrants, especially entrepreneurs, by imposing barriers to entry, thereby reduces the competitive pressure for existing firms, and thus lowers research efficiency in the economy.
